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<국문초록>
본 논고에서는 한국의 해역 내에서의 CCS 프로젝트를 위한 기존의 정부의 규
제와 바람직한 모델이 될 수 있는 규제 프레임을 비교 연구 하고자 한다. 그러함
으로써 한국의 기존 환경법과 국제관습 사이에 놓여 있는 해안 CCS 활동과 CCS
저장 프로젝트가 어떻게 견고하고 독자적인 법적 기틀을 마련하는데 유효할 수
있는지 분석하고자 한다. 이산화탄소 포집 및 저장 기술(CCS)은 산업 활동에서
배출되는 온실가스가 대기에 도달하기 전에 지중에 저장하는 것을 가능하게 하는
데 이 CCS 기술은 이산화탄소를 지질층에 주입함으로써 기존 석유유전에서 원유
의 생산량을 향상시킬 수 있기도 하다; 그러한 공정에서 대부분의 이산화탄소는
지표면으로 다시 돌아오지 않음이 밝혀졌으며 따라서 이런 방식 속에서 잠재적으
로 이산화탄소를 저장하는 것이 가능하다는 것을 보여준다.
일부의 친환경 학자나 활동가들이 CCS 의 수행을 반대하는 가운데 그 외의 다
수는 보다 더 친환경적이 대체 기술이 보급되기를 기다리는 동안에 CCS 기술이
온실가스의 실제적인 감소와 산업생산지수를 효과적으로 유지함에 있어서 가교가
될 수 있을 것으로 보고 있다. 이러한 이산화탄소 보관 활동은 육상과 해상 둘
모두의 산업경제에 적용될 수 있다.
한국에는 탄소를 저장할 수 있는 육상의 장소가 마땅하지 않기에 해안에서의
CCS 작업을 기획할 필요가 있을 것이다. 법적인 의미에서 이는 호재일 수 있는
데 왜냐하면 국가적 그리고 지역적인 행정상의 문제들이 겹치는 혼란을 피할 수
있고 또한 더 나아가 기존의 국제관습이 적용되는 해안 CCS 활동에서 많은 것을
참조 할 수 있기 때문이다. 1996 런던 프로토콜, 유럽연합의 “the CCS Directive”,
OSPAR Decision 2007/2와 유엔 산하의 교토 프로토콜등이 그러한 예시가 될 수
있다. 본 논고는 그러한 컨벤션들과 대한민국의 환경법령을 비교 분석하여 한국이
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To assist in its efforts to prevent climate change, the South Korea
government has made strong commitments to reduce its carbon emissions.1)
In order to achieve those emission reductions while preserving the
industrial capacity of its domestic industries, Korea has decided to integrate
carbon capture and storage (CCS) technologies into its overall strategy.2)
Because Korea has few suitable onshore storage locations for carbon
storage, it will need to plan for offshore CCS operations3). This article
explores how South Korea might best adopt its current environmental
regulatory framework to govern the risks of those offshore CCS activities.
1) The Republic of Korea is commonly known as South Korea; this research will use
both terms interchangeably. At the time of writing, the two states of the Republic of
Korea and of the Democratic Republic of Korea were undertaking discussions that
might foreseeably include a potential end-of-war agreement, which might entail a
singular government for the Korean peninsula. Nevertheless, this research has been
conducted with an assumption of continuity of the present condition, except where
otherwise note herein.
2) United Nations Environmental Program, “Overview of the Republic of Korea’s National
Strategy for Green Growth,” (UNEP, April 2010), 20 and 37.
3) The Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum (CSLF) has reported out that the Korean
Ministry of Fish, responsible for certain marine environmental issues, had spent
approximately 40M USD on identification of offshore storage sites in the years
2011-2015. Further, the Korea Research Institute of Ships & Ocean Engineering
(KRISO), the Korea National Oil Corporation (KNOC), and the Korea Institute of
Ocean Science & Technology (KIOST) have identified a suitable geological CO2
storage site in the southwestern seabed of the Ulleung Basin (60 km east of Ulsan, on
the east coast of South Korea); see Carbon Sequestration Leadership Forum , “Korea;”
available at https://www.cslforum.org/cslf/Members/Korea . Accordingly, KRISO has
opened the Offshore CCS Research Center to develop necessary technologies for
offshore CCS activities; available at: http://www.kriso.re.kr/intro-research/offshore–
ccs-research-unit/.
해안 CCS 저장 프로젝트를 수행하는 데에 있어서 기존의 한국법규와 국제 컨벤
션에서 얻을 수 있는 주요 원리들을 반영하여 해당 영역에서 지도적인 모델이 될
수 있음을 시사 하려 한다.
주제어 : 이산화탄소 포집및 보관, CCS, 이산화탄소, 하이드레이트, 해안, 대한민국, 주입, 
온실 가스, 기후 변화 
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The South Korean government announced its goal to achieve commercially
viable carbon capture and storage technology by 2020. As of Fall 2016, the
South Korean government has yet to enact specific regulation to address the
risks and hazards, amongst other legal questions presented, of offshore CCS
activities.
Given the advanced state of several offshore CCS projects in other
waters overseas, and given the decade plus progress in legal scholarship,
there are existing laws for offshore CCS in a few countries, operational
international maritime conventions that have binding guidance for private
operators, and scholastic research has, for the most part, stabilized onto
certain policy points.4) Thus a menu of regulatory models can be presumed
to exist for Korean policy makers.
Given that South Korea has yet to enact specific legislation regarding
offshore CCS activities, research needs be undertaken to determine if a
sufficient regulatory regime is already in place, or if incomplete, a
determination would need to be made to identify where regulatory drafting
could be helpful. Or, should there be a finding that existing legal
frameworks are wholly inadequate, research would need to be presented in
determining which legal model would be robust for the facts and
circumstances of South Korea’s offshore CCS activities.
In short, this article will present an argument that current Korean
environmental regulatory efforts are insufficient for the facts and
circumstances of offshore CCS storage projects and that they will need
revising, especially if there is a goal to come in alignment with
international standards, such as under the CDM’s Decision 10/CMP.7 on
4) While the present article is focused on the legal issues particular to the potential
regulation of offshore CCS activities in the waters of the Republic of Korea (South
Korea), much of the analysis builds on previous related research. See Michael G. Faure
& Roy A. Partain, Carbon Capture and Storage: Efficient Policies for Risk Governance
and Compensation (MIT Press, 2017). For a scholastic perspective on ideal CCS
regulatory policies, see Faure & Partain, 207-217. See also Roy A. Partain & Michael
G. Faure, Development of a Regulatory Framework for CDM-Enabled Offshore
Carbon Capture and Storage (OCCS) in China. In: The Rise of the Regulatory State:
The U.S., E.U. and China’s Theory and Practice (Stefan Weishaar & Niels Philipsen,
eds., Edward Elgar; 2017).
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CCS storage projects or the EU CCS Directive.
A comparative review of existing Korean regulations against model
regulatory frameworks will be presented.5) The final finding will be that
South Korea’s existing environmental laws and existing international
conventions to regulate offshore CCS activities can be used to draft a
stand-alone CCS legal framework appropriate for offshore CCS storage
projects in South Korean waters.
Ⅰ. Facts and Circumstances of Offshore Carbon Capture and
Storage
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a collection of technologies and
practices that could enable the permanent removal of the greenhouse gas
carbon dioxide from the atmosphere by placing it into permanent geological
storage. This article focuses on the storage aspect, on those activities that
occur after capture of the CO2 from emission sources and after the
transport of the CO2 to an offshore injection and storage facility.
1. Technology of Deep Earth Carbon Storage
CCS is known by several related names. A variant common in the U.S.
is carbon capture and sequestration. A related concept that adds a policy to
use the carbon dioxide in green industrial practices if possible prior to
storage is called carbon capture, utilization, and storage (CCUS).
There is a related practice that involves the injection of carbon dioxide
with a goal of enhancing hydrocarbon recovery is called Enhanced Oil
Recovery with Carbon Dioxide Flooding (EOR-CO2); while storage of
carbon dioxide is not a primary goal of EOR-CO2, a high percentage of the
5) Korean legislative materials are available online at the Korea Legislation Research
Institute’s (KLRI) Statutes of the Republic of Korea website; available at:
http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/main.do; example, the Framework Act on Environmental
Policy is available at: http://elaw.klri.re.kr/eng_service/lawView.do?hseq=44666&lang=ENG.
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CO2 does indeed become permanently ‘lost’ in geological storage.6)
Another related technology is the practice of re-injecting co-produced
acidic gases from natural gas wells back into the original gas reservoir,
this is called acid gas injection (AGI).7)
All of these approaches involve the injection of supercritical carbon
dioxide into deep geological reservoirs wherein a majority of the injected
carbon dioxides remains permanently, but only CCS, CCUS, and AGI inject
with a primary goal of permanent geological storage of the carbon dioxide.
Carbon capture is a group of technologies that enable recover of the
carbon dioxide emitted from combustion activities at power plants and other
industrial activities. A common approach is to cascade a liquid solution,
such as a glycol, down on an upwardly moving chimney of emissions,
trapping and dissolving the carbon dioxide into the glycol. The glycol can
then be further treated to release the carbon dioxide, which can then be
temperature treated and filter treated to remove impurities. Once that has
occurred, the carbon dioxide can be temperature-and-pressure adjusted to
meet pipeline conditions for transport away from the combustion and
capture facility. Carbon dioxide can also be transported in containers and on
oceanic vessels, but most CCS plans call for pipelines.
Carbon dioxide has long been a commonly used industrial chemical so
regulations for its shipping, transportation, and handling are well developed.
There are known risks, but as everyone who drinks carbonated beverages
will appreciate, it is not generally seen as a hazardous chemical. There are
thousands of miles of existing carbon dioxide pipelines that have operated
6) See Faure & Partain, at 17. While shale oil and gas have benefitted from technologies
that evolved from EOR practices, such as hydraulic fracturing, carbon dioxide flooding
has not been widely used in their production. However, research is underway to
replace hydraulic fracturing with carbon dioxide flooding for shale oil and gas deposits.
See Kevin Bullis, “Skipping the Water in Fracking,” MIT Technology Review, March
22, 2013; available at https://www.technologyreview.com/s/512656/skipping-the-water-
in-fracking/.
7) Carbon dioxide is an acidic gas; e.g., when it blends with water it creates carbonic
acid (H2CO3), albeit in practice carbonic acid primarily results in the salts of carbonate
and bicarbonate, which can then affect the durability of metals or dissolve underground
materials such as limestone. See.
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for decades; thus there is a broad base of experience to draw upon for the
development of carbon dioxide pipelines that would be required for CCS
transportation needs.
Once the carbon dioxide is delivered to the injection facility, it will need
to undergo a final stage treating process to purify it prior to its becoming
a super-critical fluid.8) As a supercritical fluid, carbon dioxide exhibits
behaviors common to both gases and liquids. Supercritical carbon dioxide is
a commonly used industrial solvent; it is perhaps best known as the
chemical used to wash out caffeine from green coffee beans to provide
caffeine for soda drinks and to produce decaffeinated coffee beans. After its
preparation, the supercritical carbon dioxide flows into a well and is then
injected deep into the Earth. Upon reaching the bottom of the well, and
exiting from the wellbore holes into the reservoir, the supercritical carbon
dioxide expands and forces itself into the pore space between the granular
elements of the reservoir rock formations.
For ‘conventional’ onshore CCS projects, once injected into the earth,
there are several means to ensure the permanence of the storage. One
issue is the existence of a cap rock formation, that serves as a shield over
the injected volumes preventing their vertical escape from the storage
system. A second issue is the potential for the carbon dioxide to force
itself through capillary action into tiny crevices, from which the fluid would
not escape. A third issue is the potential for the carbon dioxide to work as
a solvent on the underground materials, such as limestone, to create
carbonates that could then re-solidify in place and permanently trap and
secure the carbon dioxide. A fourth issue is that the injected volumes of
carbon dioxide could become dissolved into deep underground aquifers,
particularly saline aquifers, that are already secure in their geological depth.
Estimates suggest, that if an injection project were to operate for several
decades, that approximately 2/3rds of the carbon dioxide would be
mineralized by the end of the injection project; full mineralization might
8) Becoming supercritical requires the carbon dioxide to reach a minimum of 87.98 °F
(304.25 K, 31.10 °C) and at least 72.9 atm (7.39 MPa, 1,071 psi) of pressure. In lay
parlance, this is a room-temperature condition at very high pressures.
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take several centuries to a couple millennia depending on the reservoir
conditions.9)
2. Consideration of Offshore CCS
While the onshore techniques are available offshore,10) deep sea conditions
do enable alternative storage methods not available onshore.11) Thus, the
offshore environment presents several unique opportunities to improve on
the onshore sequestration technologies.12)
First, at the right depths and pressures, carbon dioxide will no longer be
buoyant, as it is in onshore storage, but instead it will become ‘negatively
buoyant’ and seek to sink into the earth. This unique behavior would
dramatically reduce the chance of venting and seeping, as the carbon
dioxide would no longer be expected to move towards the surface.
Second, it is important to understand that carbon dioxide can react to
water to create a frozen material called a hydrate. A hydrate is a
9) Faure & Partain, at 14, citing to FN 32. Compare this loss rate with the almost
instant loss of 50% of the CO2 in EOR projects, see footnote 6.
10) See Yi Kyun Kwon, Demonstration-scale Offshore CO2 Storage Project in the
Pohang Basin, Korea, 28(2) Journal of Engineering Geology 133-160 (2018) [권이균,
‘포항분지 해상 중소규모 CO2 저장 실증연구’, 28(2) 지질공학 133-160 (2018).] See also
Hung-Man Moon et al, Design and Construction Study of an Injection Facility for
CO2 Offshore Storage, 28(2) Journal of Engineering Geology 207-215 (2018). [문흥만,
김효준, 신세진, 이용일, 권시현, & 권이균, ‘CO2 해상 지중저장을 위한 주입설비 설계 및
구축 연구’, 28(2) 지질공학 207-215 (2018).].
11) For an introductory survey to the literature on CO2 hydrate formation in the offshore
CCS context, see H. Koide, Y Shindo, Y. Tazaki, M. Iijima, K. Ito, N. Kimura, & K.
Omata, Deep Sub-Seabed Disposal of CO2 – The Most Protective Storage,
38(Suppl.) Energy Conversion and Management S253-S258 (1997); Kurt Zenz House,
Daniel P. Schrag, Charles F. Harvey, & Klaus S. Lackner, Permanent carbon dioxide
storage in deep-sea sediments, 103(33) Proceedings of the National Academy of
Sciences 12291-12295 (2006); Qi Li, Zhishen Wu, & Xioachun Li, Prediction of CO2
Leakage During Sequestration into Marine Sedimentary Strata, 50 Energy Conversion
and Management 503-509 (2009); and see also Daniel P. Schrag, Storage of Carbon
Dioxide in Offshore Sediments, 325 Science 1658-1659 (2009).
12) For an account of the development of offshore CCS technology in South Korea, see
S.G. Kang & C. Huh, R&D Status on Offshore CCS Technology and its Deployment
Plan in Korea, Proceedings of the Conference for the Korean Society for Marine
Environment & Energy, 177 (November 2011).
70  법학논고 제69집 (2020. 04)
cage-structure of water molecules that trap a singular carbon dioxide
molecule inside. Hydrates naturally occur in a variety of oceanic settings,
most notable perhaps are the vast deposits of methane hydrates offshore
most coastal nations.13) Hydrates are endothermic materials,14) so generally
speaking they are stable when trapped within geological settings. If carbon
dioxide is injection into the correct depths and pressures offshore, the
carbon dioxide would solidify and form hydrates, preventing their escape
from geologic containment, even if there were cracks or fissures in the cap
rock formation or mud barriers.
Third, in offshore saline reservoirs, the saline solutions are very similar
to the waters immediately above them in the open oceans, from which they
were derived. This enables the relocation of reservoir waters to the benthic
depths, facilitating enhanced storage capacity while also reducing the risks
of over-pressurization which might otherwise increase the risk of leaks and
venting. In the U.S., such relocation of geological salines to oceanic depths
is permitted and regulated and is a routine event in offshore operations.
Fourth, even if carbon dioxide were to escape from its geological storage,
it would likely be remediable. Because the benthic depths of the oceans, the
carbon dioxide would likely remain pooled and concentrated near the source
of the leak, enabling the recovery and removal of the carbon dioxide before
substantial harm to the water column or surrounding environments could
occur.
Thus, in offshore CCS storage operations, there are several technological
13) For discussions on the environmental impacts and potential governance thereof related
to offshore methane hydrates, see Roy A. Partain, Public and Private Regulations for
the Governance of the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates, 17 Vt. J. Envt’l L. 87
(2015); Roy A. Partain, A Comparative Legal Approach for the Risks of Offshore
Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws and Conventions, 32 Pace Envt’l L. Rev. 101
(2015); Roy A. Partain, The Application of Civil Liability for the Risks of Offshore
Methane Hydrates, 26 Fordham Envt’l L. R. 225 (2015); and Roy A. Partain, Avoiding
Epimetheus: Planning Ahead for the Commercial Development of Offshore Methane
Hydrates, 14 Sustainable Dev. L. & Pol’y 16- 25, 56- 58 (2014).
14) Endothermic means that a chemical substance needs to absorb energy in order to
react, and in this case, hydrates need to absorb energy to enable the dissolution of
the carbon dioxide from the water. If that external energy supply is not present, then
the icy structure of a hydrate is secure and stable.
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differences that should enhance the overall security of geological storage
over the safety levels of onshore CCS storage. The carbon dioxide would
not be buoyant but sinking in nature, preventing the fundamental motive of
most leaks. If monitored, over-pressured storage reservoirs could have
saline volumes safely relocated to reduce pressure and reduce the risks of
cracks or fissures that could enable the escape of carbon dioxide. Even if
the carbon dioxide were to begin to migrate towards those cracks or
fissures, the pressure and temperature of the reservoir would likely induce
hydrate formation would block and clog any additional cracks or fissure
and prevent leakage. And if that were to fail, the carbon dioxide would be
expected to pool in benthic depths and be removable prior to the onset of
any substantial injury to the surrounding ecology.
3. Conclusion to Introduction to Offshore CCS
In summary, carbon dioxide emissions can be prevented by capturing
them at their emissions point, by processing and treating them to enable
their ready transportation, and by injecting them into deep geological
storage wherein they will eventually become mineralized and permanently
prevented from atmospheric interactions. While there are substantial reasons
to expect that onshore CCS could be undertaken in a safe and reliable
manner, there are reasons to expect offshore CCS to be even safer and
more secure in its prevention of accidental release of carbon dioxide.
While these arguments might have been paramount in the early planning
of the world’s earliest and longest running CCS projects, it remains
insightful to observe that the CCS projects of Snøhvit and Sleipner in
Norway are offshore CCS storage facilities that remain safe and secure as
of the date of this writing in 2018; in fact, the Norwegian Ministry of
Petroleum and Energy has recently called for planning to consider three
new offshore CCS storage locations on the Norwegian continental shelf at
the Utsira, Heimdal and Smeaheia field locations.15) Thus both scientific
15) Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy “Initiates Feasibility Study on Subsea
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expectations and historical experiences suggest the safety and reliability of
offshore CCS storage.
Ⅱ. Existing International Regulatory Frameworks for
Offshore Carbon Storage
As stated earlier, the idea of CCS is not new and offshore CCS activities
have been undertaken in Norway for decades, thus international conventions
exist that correspond with the regulatory needs of offshore CCS storage
projects.
This section will review four such models, namely that of the EU’s CCS
Directive, the accommodations for CCS storage projects under the London
Protocol, the accommodations for CCS storage projects under OSPAR, and
finally the detailed results of the CDM’s Decision 10/CMP.7 (2011). It will
follow the analyses that a common vision of offshore guidance can be
found across the four conventions.16)
1. EU’s CCS Directive
The European Union has produced binding legal guidance for carbon
capture storage projects, in its Directive on the Geological Storage of Carbon
Dioxide, also known as the CCS Directive.17) The Directive itself does
CO2 Storage,” 01 January 2016; available at https://www.regjeringen.no/en/aktuelt/
statoil-skal-utgreie-co2-lager-pa-norsk-kontinentalsokkel/id2469150/.
16) This section does not review the US EPA guidance on CCS injection wells, as
advocated by Jang et al., because the EPA’s guidance is designed for onshore CCS
activities and not offshore as examined herein; see Eunseon Jang, Seong-Taek Yun,
Byoung-Young Choi, & David Chung Hun Kang, Status and Implications of
Regulatory Frameworks for Environmental Management of Geologic CO2 Storage in
USA and EU, 17(6) 지하수토환경 9 - 22 (2012).
17) Directive 2009/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2009
on the geological storage of carbon dioxide and amending Council Directive
85/337/EEC, European Parliament and Council Directives 2000/60/EC, 2001/80/EC,
2004/35/EC, 2006/12/EC, 2008/1/EC and Regulation (EC) No 1013/2006 (Text with
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include both onshore and offshore CCS,18) and it appears to provide
governance for the offshore CCS projects in Norway,19) thus its framework
can be guiding for offshore CCS storage projects in similar Korean waters.20)
The Directive requires that CCS storage be rock-based and not
water-column-based; the sequestered CO2 volumes must be contained. Art.
1, Sec. 2 sets out the goals of CCS storage, “The purpose of
environmentally safe geological storage of CO2 is permanent containment of
CO2 in such a way as to prevent and, where this is not possible, eliminate
as far as possible negative effects and any risk to the environment and
human health.” As such, the key terms for Korea’s own regulatory
frameworks are ‘environmentally safe geological storage’ and ‘permanent
containment of CO2’ to ensure that the offshore storage technology is
securely deep geological, and not water-column, based in character. Further,
that geological storage needs to be found in ‘lithostratigraphical subdivision’
within ‘underground geological formations,’ further clarifying the necessity
of rock-based storage.21) The Directive also explicitly bans water-column
based CCS storage technologies.22)
The Directive is very focused on ensuring that scientific and engineering
standards are kept very high for CCS storage operations. The examination
of potential storage sites is to be rigorous, as “[a] geological formation shall
only be selected as a storage site, if under the proposed conditions of use
EEA relevance) (Hereinafter ‘CCS Directive.’); available at: https://ec.europa.eu/clima/
policies/lowcarbon/ccs/directive_en.
18) The Preamble does at sections 12, 13, and 14, with reference to the CCS provisions
made under the London Protocol and OSPAR. CCS Directive Art. 2, Sec. 1 provides
specific inclusion of all CCS projects within the UNCLOS-delimited exclusive
economic zones and on their continental shelves of the EU Member States.
19) The offshore projects are Statoil’s CCS projects at Sleipner and Snøhvit, and the
potentially upcoming project at injection wells east of the Troll field on the
Norwegian continental shelf. See Statoil, “Statoil evaluating new CO2 storage project
on the Norwegian continental shelf,” 30 June 2017, available at: https://www.statoil.
com/en/news/co2-ncs.html.
20) A similar observation was made by Yi, see JongYeong Yi, 유럽연합의 이산화탄소 포
집,저장 지침에 관한 연구(‘Zur Richtlinie der Europaischen Kommission zur
geologischen Speicherung von Kohlendioxid’), 14(2) Jungang Law Review 7-33 (2012).
21) CCS Directive, art. 3, secs 1 and 4.
22) CCS Directive, art. 1, sec. 4, and at art. 3, sec. 2.
74  법학논고 제69집 (2020. 04)
there is no significant risk of leakage, and if no significant environmental or
health risks exist.”23) The Directive contains an Annex I which supplements
Art 4’s requirement with detailed lists of the types of data, and of the types
of evidences expected, to be gathered and included in a permit application.24)
Annex I requires a dozen different types of scientific data,25) construction of
a three-dimensional static geological earth model utilizing seven different
types of data,26) a model of the characterization of the storage dynamic
behavior using a score of data sets,27) and both a sensitivity characterization
and a risk assessment,28) all followed by a five factor hazard
characterization.29) This reflects the EU’s guidance that much of the risk of
CCS storage sites is determined by the place and condition of the storage
site itself and that the information regarding site selection be both rigorous
and publicly available.30) Very similar levels of caution and prevention-based
efforts can be found for the operation period as well, both in the Directive
and at Annex II.31)
The polluter pays principle (PPP) guides the function of the liability
regime of the Directive.32) The operator’s liability is only cut-off if and
only if certain terms of financing and gas-stability are made evident.33)
Once those tests are met, then the liability and responsibility for the
23) CCS Directive, art. 4, sec. 4. See also.
24) CCS Directive, Annex I: Criteria for the Characterization and Assessment of the Potential
Storage Complex and Surrounding Area Referred to in Article 4(3).
25) CCS Directive, Annex I, Step 1: Data collection.
26) CCS Directive, Annex I, Step 2: Building the three-dimensional static geological earth
model.
27) CCS Directive, Annex I, Step 3.1: Characterization of the storage dynamic behavior.
28) CCS Directive, Annex I, Step 3.2: Sensitivity characterization and Step 3.3: Risk
assessment.
29) CCS Directive, Annex I, 3.3.1. (The enumeration in the original follows an unorthodox
change in format.)
30) Art. 4, sec. 2, with reference to arts. 26 and 27.
31) See arts. 7 through 11 for operation periods, 12 through 15 for post-closure planning,
and Annex Ii: Criteria for Establishing and Updating the Monitoring Plan Referred to
in Article 13(2) and for Post-Closure Monitoring in support of both.
32) CCS Directive, art 16, sec. 5, with regards to “necessary corrective measures, as well
as measures related to the protection of human health”. Additional PPP duties for the
operator are found at CCS Directive, art 17, sec. 2.
33) CCS Directive, art. 18, sec. 1.
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storage sites and its sequestered CO2 volumes is to be transferred to the
competent authority of the Member State.34)
To prevent problems of financial insolvency, the operator is required to
present proof of financial means to provide funding for a variety of
potential needs, including for compensation.35) The financial means must be
in-place from the time of first permitting until the final transposition of the
liabilities and responsibilities, as discussed in the previous paragraph.36)
There is also a requirement for funds to be transferred to the competent
authority in advance of that final transposition and that the funds should be
adequate to support at least thirty (30) years of post-closure expenses.37)
There are additional rules in place to prevent injuries. Transboundary
cooperation to prevent transboundary injuries is required of the Member
States.38) In alignment with the Århus Convention, the Directive requires
Member States to make available “public environmental information relating
to the geological storage of CO2.”39) The Member States are also called
upon to ensure that “effective, proportionate and dissuasive” penalties are
brought to bear on the operators.40)
Thus, the Directive reflects concerns on scientific and engineering
standards, the clear provision of liability (both before and after closure),
and of financial arrangements to prevent problems with rules of civil
liability and to ensure the function of the PPP.
2. London Convention and its Protocol
The London Protocol builds on the London Convention, preparing for a
more updated implementation of the same concerns to prevent dumping of
wastes into the ocean.41) As such, a key question becomes whether injected
34) Id. See also CCS Directive, art. 18, sec. 5.
35) CCS Directive, arts. 19 and 20.
36) CCS Directive, art. 19, secs. 1 and 3(a).
37) CCS Directive, art. 20, sec. 1.
38) CCS Directive, art. 24.
39) CCS Directive, art. 26.
40) CCS Directive, art. 28.
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CO2 volumes qualify as a waste or as something else.
The Convention bars offshore dumping of Annex I wastes altogether,42)
requires a prior special permit for items on Annex II,43) and requires a
prior general permit for all other items.44) Under Annex I, CO2 might
qualify under “Crude oil and its wastes,”45) under Annex II, it might qualify
as “Materials which, though of a non-toxic nature, may become harmful
due to the quantities in which they are dumped;”46) and could also raise
concerns under the Annex III provisions for all other items, namely at (1)
Amounts, (3) Properties, (5) Persistence, and (7) “Susceptibility to physical,
chemical and biochemical changes and interaction in the aquatic
environment with other dissolved organic and inorganic materials.”47)
The Convention requires all Parties to provide “appropriate measures to
prevent and punish conduct in contravention of the provisions of this
Convention.”48) Further, rules of civil liability are required of the Parties,
that they “develop procedures for the assessment of liability and the
settlement of disputes regarding dumping.”49) Potentially, but not explicitly,
the concept of settlement of disputes could include financial measures that
ensure payment of established damages.
The Protocol, being from 1996 and as amended in 2006, reflects evolution
in the principles of international environmental law. The polluter pays
principle (PPP),50) the precautionary principle,51) and a novel duty to “not to
41) Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other
Matter (‘London Convention 1972’); 26 UST 2403, 1046 UNTS 120, 11 ILM 1294
(1972); and the latter 1996 Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine
Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (‘London Protocol’); 36 ILM 1
(1997).
42) London Convention, art. 4, sec. 1(a).
43) London Convention, art. 4, sec. 1(b).
44) London Convention, art. 4, sec. 1(c).
45) London Convention, Annex I, sec. 5.
46) London Convention, Annex II, sec. D.
47) London Convention, Annex III, sec. A(1, 3, 5, and 7).
48) London Convention, art. 7, sec. 2.
49) London Convention, art. 10.
50) London Protocol Art. 3, sec. 2.
51) London Protocol Art. 3, sec. 1.
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transfer, directly or indirectly, damage or likelihood of damage from one
part of the environment to another or transform one type of pollution into
another.”52) The Protocol follows the norms established on the Convention
with regards to enforcement of the rules and for the provision of
“procedures regarding liability.”53) Thus the notions of liability, fault, and
provisions of punishments, enforcement, and liability systems are similar for
both the Convention and the Protocol, albeit the Protocol represents a more
modern form.
Where a key difference lays between the two conventions, is the explicit
mention, or lack thereof, of the seabed. While the Convention limited waste
dumping ‘at sea,’ the Protocol adds “any storage of wastes or other matter
in the seabed and the subsoil thereof,” to the definition of waste dumping.54)
(Emphasis added.) The Convention defined the sea as “’Sea’ means all
marine waters other than the internal waters of States,”55) whereas the
Protocol expanded it to “all marine waters other than the internal waters of
States, as well as the seabed and the subsoil thereof; it does not include
sub-seabed repositories accessed only from land.”56) (Emphasis added.)
Thus, notionally, the Protocol includes a more overt focus to protect the
seabed from waste dumping, and thus could frustrate offshore CCS storage
plans.
While the London Convention did not explicitly provide for storage of
CO2 volumes in the ocean’s seabed,57) the Protocol has been updated to
include certain methods of offshore CCS storage.58) The CCS Guidelines
provide no new rules or guidance on liability, financial measures, or the
52) London Protocol Art. 3, sec. 3.
53) London Protocol Art. 10, sec. 2; and Art 15.
54) London Convention, art. 3, sec. 1(a)(i); and London Protocol Art. 1, sec. 4.1.3.
55) London Convention, art. 3, sec. 3.
56) London Protocol Art. 1, sec. 7.
57) But see London Convention, art. 4, sec. 3, that does limit the strongest prohibition on
dumping to Annex I items, and barring arguments for including CO2 on Annex, it
might be possible to place CO2 under Annex III guidance, and thus be potentially
permissible.
58) 2012 Specific Guidelines for the Assessment of Carbon Dioxide for Disposal into
Sub-Seabed Geological Formations adopted 2 November 2012 (LC 34/15, annex 8).
(Hereinafter ‘CCS Guidelines’).
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like, but they do provide extensive details on scientific and engineering
norms and expectations. The details of the carbon stream itself are to be
accurately characterized.59) Similarly to the EU CCS Directive, the CCS
Guidelines provides a strong focus on the scientific investigation of the
subsea seabed storage site.60) There is a requirement for study into the
potential effects of the CO2 subsea sequestration, with need to return both
a risk assessment and an Impact hypothesis.61) Thus, the CCS Guidelines
add content to the London Protocol so that en toto its overall approach is
similar to the EU’s CCS Directive.
3. OSPAR
The Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (the ‘OSPAR Convention’)62) includes many EU
Member States as well as the EU itself,63) thus the Convention run
complementary to the EU CCS Directive and to the London Protocol for
those countries.
The OSPAR Convention does not directly address matters of enforcement
59) CCS Guidelines, arts. 4 and 5.
60) CCS Guidelines, art. 6.
61) CCS Guidelines, art. 7; see 7.7 through 7.10 and see also 7.11 through 7.15.
62) Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the North-East Atlantic
(OSPAR Convention); 2354 UNTS 67; 32 ILM 1069 (1993); available at
https://www.ospar.org/convention/text . The moniker of OSPAR is based in history;
“OSPAR stands for Oslo and Paris, and the acronym refers to the documentary
history of the Convention in that it conjoined the Convention for the Prevention of
Marine Pollution by Dumping from Ships and Aircraft, “Oslo Convention” (1972),
against at-sea dumping of wastes with the Convention for the Prevention of Marine
Pollution from Land-Based Sources, “Paris Convention” (1974), against land-based sea
pollution and oil pollution. OSPAR was founded under Article 197 of UNCLOS for
global and regional cooperation.” Roy Andrew Partain, A Comparative Legal Approach
for the Risks of Offshore Methane Hydrates: Existing Laws and Conventions, 32 Pace
Envtl. L. Rev. 791 (2015), 829.
63) Namely, they are Belgium, Denmark, the European Union, Finland, France, Germany,
Iceland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, plus the
EU. See “Contracting Parties,” available at: https://www.ospar.org/organisation/
contracting-parties.
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or of provision for liability, rather it requires Parties to:
“take all possible steps to prevent and eliminate pollution and shall
take the necessary measures to protect the maritime area against the
adverse effects of human activities … To this end Contracting
Parties shall, individually and jointly, adopt programmes and
measures and shall harmonise their policies and strategies.”64)
OSPAR is a convention between states, and while it requires that each
Party
“OSPAR requires the Contacting Parties to take all possible steps to
prevent and eliminate pollution to protect the maritime area. OSPAR
requires the Contracting States to adopt programs and measures and
to cross-harmonize their policies.”65)
Nevertheless, the obligations cease without further clarification as to
specifics of enforcement, so there are no particular requirements with
regards to regulatory frameworks, liability rules, or provisions for financial
needs.
Annex II provides for the exclusion of CO2 streams when used for
geological storage.66) The Annex II requires four basic conditions for CCS
storage projects to qualify under this rule: (i) disposal is into a sub-soil
geological formation, (ii) that the streams consist overwhelmingly of carbon
dioxide, (iii) no co-mingling of other wastes in the stream, and (iv)
intention of permanent storage with no expectation of significant adverse
consequences.67)
OSPAR Decision 2007/2 provides clarity for subsea storage of CO2
64) OSPAR art. 2., sec. 1.
65) Partain (2015), supra at 53, 829.
66) OSPAR, Annex II, art. 3, secs. 1 and 2(f).
67) OSPAR, Annex II, art. 3, sec. 2(f)(i) through (iv). See also Annex III, art. 3, sec. 3(a)
though (d).
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within the OSPAR Convention.68) ‘Sub-soil geological formation’ is defined
as “geological formations in the sub-soil of the OSPAR maritime area,
including sub-seabed geological formations;”69) enabling the use of storage
site further offshore than territorial seas. The Decisions requires an
eight-part “full risk assessment and management process” to be
satisfactorily completed, as judged by the Party’s competent authority that
the CCS storage project “will not lead to significant adverse consequences
for the marine environment, human health and other legitimate uses of the
maritime area.”70) Data created by the operator with regards to initial
applications and annual updates are to be provided to both the
Public-at-Large and to the OSPAR Commission, and for “[s]ufficient
stakeholder involvement” during the permitting process,71) all in alignment
with Århus.
Throughout OSPAR, there is a repeated requirement for the Parties to
“ensure the application of best available techniques and best environmental
practice as so defined, including, where appropriate, clean technology;”72) and
such would be required of CCS storage projects, as allowed. The first
requirement is detailed as “’best available techniques’ means the latest stage
of development (state of the art) of processes, of facilities or of methods of
operation which indicate the practical suitability of a particular measure for
limiting discharges, emissions and waste.”73) Important for avoiding
regulatory centralization and ossification, the Appendix further guides that
“’best available techniques’ for a particular process will change with time in
the light of technological advances, economic and social factors, as well as
changes in scientific knowledge and understanding.”74) Further, a working
68) OSPAR Decision 2007/2 on the Storage of Carbon Dioxide Streams in Geological
Formations.
69) OSPAR Decision 2007/2; art 1.1.
70) OSPAR Decision 2007/2; art 3.1; the eight part analysis is found at 3.2.1 through
3.2.6(iii).
71) OSPAR Decision 2007/2; art 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6.
72) OSPAR art. 1., sec. 3(b)(i) and (ii). See also Annex III, art. 2, sec. 1(a) and (b).
73) OSPAR, Appendix 1 Criteria for the Definition of Practices and Techniques Mentioned
in Paragraph 3(B)(I) of Article 2 of the Convention, sec. 2.
74) OSPAR, Appendix 1, sec. 3.
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definition for ‘best environmental practice’ is provided with nine factors of
analysis, which provide “application of the most appropriate combination of
environmental control measures and strategies.”75)
Broadly summarizing, the OSPAR requirements for offshore CCS storage
projects is very similar in approach to the EU CCS Directive and the
approach of the London Protocol, except for its lack of specific clarity of
means of enforcement, liability rules, and financial provisions. But that
OSPAR operates within the umbra of the EU and its directives, this lack is
not a major deficit.
4. Clean Development Mechanism on CCS Regulatory Frameworks
The Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol enables
financial opportunities for countries listed on Annex I of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) to invest in
emissions reduction projects in non-Annex I countries whilst availing those
Annex I countries of baseline emission offsets.76)
While many might expect South Korea to be considered as a developed
economy, under the UNFCCC, it is listed as a non-Annex I country (as is
North Korea)77) and thus could avail itself of the CDM financial benefits,78)
thus Korea’s attention to the CDM’s treatment of CCS frameworks may be
75) OSPAR, Appendix 1, sec. 6(a) through (i).
76) Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
opened for signature Mar. 16, 1998, 2303 U.N.T.S. 148 [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol]
(entered into force Feb. 16, 2005), at art. 12. United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC], at Annex I.
See also “Clean Development Mechanism (CDM),” United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change; available at http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol
/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php.
77) Both the Republic of Korea and the Democratic Republic of Korea are currently listed
as “Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention;” see UNFCCC, “List of Non-Annex I
Parties to the Convention,” available at: http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/
parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php.
78) See an anticipatory article on the CDM’s adoption of CCS activities at JaeHyup Lee,
Legal Measures to Fulfill Eco-Friendly Implementation of the Proposed Basic Law
on Green Growth -Market Mechanisms for Responding to Climate Change, 31(1)
Environmental Legal Research 39-62 (2009).
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rewarding.79)
However, if there should one day be a political result of one country in
the area of the formerly two Koreas, there is some uncertainty as to the
future standing of these UNFCCC issues. Should either one of the Koreas
agree to merge into the other Korea, and thus should that one Korea
become the singular survivor state for both previous states, then Article 15
‘Succession in respect of part of territory’ would apply to the new state
and the UNFCCC and the rules of the CDM would continue to apply as
they had before.80) On the other hand, were the two Koreas to agree that
the new successor country was to be in fact a ‘newly independent State,’
then they would not necessarily be bound by the UNFCCC, amongst other
conventions, and additional analysis would be required including its options
under Art 17;81) thus is beyond the scope of the present research.
While the CDM did not originally include CCS storage activities within
its parameters, the CDM has been updated via Decision 10/CMP.7
(‘Decision’)82) to enable certain CCS projects to be included.83) Furthermore,
the Decision requires the provision and enforcement of particular regulatory
frameworks for a Host to receive the CDM’s financial benefits for its CCS
projects. Notably, the Decision provides extensive requirements for scientific
and engineering protocols and standards, above and beyond those
requirements provided in the previously discussed EU CCS Directive (which
79) A then-contemporary appraisal of the Decision and its potential impacts on Korean
CCS policy planning can be found at Hyon-Jeong Noh, Cheol Huh & Seong-Gil Kang,
Analysis of Modality and Procedures for CCS as CDM Project and Its Countmeasures,
15(3) Journal of the Korean Society for Marine Environmental Engineering 263-272
(2012).
80) Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, 1946 UNTS 3; 17
ILM 1488 (1978); 72 AJIL 971 (1978) (Hereinafter ‘Convention on Succession’); see art.
15. Available at: http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/3_2_1978.pdf.
81) Convention on Succession, arts. 16 and 17, see also art. 19. A choice to remain
committed to multi-lateral conventions, in the case of a newly independent State,
would need an Art. 22 declaration to that effect.
82) Decision 10/CMP.7: Modalities and procedures for carbon dioxide capture and storage
in geological formations as clean development mechanism project activities. Available
at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2011/cmp7/eng/10a02.pdf#page=13 [hereinafter ‘Decision
10/CMP.7’].
83) Decision 10/CMP.7, art. 1.
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were already more robust than those called for in the London Protocol and
the OSPAR guidance.)84) The Decision also calls for establishment of
regulations at the Hosting State level and for contractual arrangements at
the operator level to provide for the complete addressing of property rights
and liability rules to ensure the proper mechanisms to deal with injuries
and potential damages.85) There are also requirements for financial
provisions and other financial mechanisms to ensure that the PPP remains
functional and that there will be sufficient capital available for all of the
issues that might arise over the life of the storage facility.86)
This repeated cascade of requirements for a holistic approach to science,
engineering, establishment of legal rights and liabilities, and of financial
provisions and mechanisms result in the Decision being as functional a
model as the EU CCS Directive if not an even more detailed framework.
5. Summary and Observations
The four international and transboundary conventions analyzed in this
section have provided a clear framework for offshore CCS storage policies.
They all require the placement of CO2 into subterranean structures and not
in the water column; most requiring placement into rock structures. It is
clear that they all provide rigorous attention to the matters of site selection,
of risk/hazard analyses of the proposed storage system, and of other issues
related to the successful containment of CO2 and the prevention of
environmental and human-related injuries. The more fully developed EU
CCS Directive and the CDM’s Decision 10/CMP.7 both provide extensive
requirements for management of liabilities and damages, including provision
of financial measure in advance of permitting. These frameworks, while
84) For example, see the extensive lists of such requirements at Decision 10/CMP.7,
Appendix art. C, sec. 4; art. F, sec. 8; art. G, sec. 10; art. I, secs. 15 to 17; and the
whole of Appendix B.
85) For example, see Decision 10/CMP.7, Appendix art. C, sec. 4(f); art. F, sec. 8(c) and
(e); art. G, sec. 10(f); and Appendix B, art. 5, secs. 22 through 25.
86) For example, see Decision 10/CMP.7, Appendix art. C, sec. 4(f); art. G, sec. 10(g); and
Appendix B, art. 4, secs. 18 through 21.
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perhaps remaining in on-going improvement processes, do represent very
good models of how South Korea might seek to provide regulatory
guidance for offshore CCS storage operations.
Ⅲ. Review of In-Place Korean Legislation
This section will attempt to provide review and comparative analysis of
nine of the most relevant rule sets to offshore CCS storage activities in
Korean law.87) It will broadly demonstrate that while a broad framework is
in place, it is mostly patchwork without explicit consideration or provision
for offshore CCS storage projects and as such lacks the coordination and
completeness of regulatory measures as would be required under the
CDM’s Decision 10/CMP.7, for example. As such, it will be suggested that
87) In many ways, this research is the counterpart of the report produced by the Korean
National Institute of Environmental Research, which analyzed CCS regulatory
frameworks from around the world. See Heon Kang, Seong-Taek Yun, & Ki-Hak
Park, 환경분야 CCS(이산화탄소 포집 및 저장)에 대한 법적근거 마련 연구 (‘Research
on a Legal Framework for CCS’), Korean Ministry of Environment, National Institute
of Environmental Research, December 2012. Similarly, this article seeks to complement
and extend on previous Korean scholarship for onshore CCS, including but not limited
to: Koh Moon-Hyun, Necessity of Legislation of CCS and its Major Contents to Cut
Down Greenhouse Gas, 74(1) Public Land Law Review 317 – 341 (2016) [고문현, 온
실가스 감축을 위한 CCS 법 제정의 필요성과 주요내용, 토지공법연구, 74권 1호, 한국토
지공법학회, 2016, 317p-341p], Koh Mon-Hyun, Legal Issues of CCS, 35 Soongil Law
Review 31 – 74 (2016), [고문현/안태용, CCS 관련 법적 쟁점, 법학논총, 35권, 숭실대학
교 법학연구소, 2016, 31p-74p], Koh Moon-Hyun, Underground Injection Control (UIC)
Program Class Ⅵ Rule of EPA and Its Implications, 24(4) Legal Research 19-40
(2016) [고문현, ‘미국 환경보호청 (EPA)의 이산화탄소 지중저장 규칙과 그 시사점’, 24(4)
법학연구 19-40 (2016)]; Jun-Seo Lee, Legal Tasks for Risk Management to Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS), 40(1) Research in Environmental Law 79-110 (2018) [이준
서, ‘이산화탄소 포집 및 저장(CCS)으로 인한 리스크 관리를 위한 법적 과제’, 40(1) 환경
법연구 41-77 (2018)]; Soonja Lee, Research on the Legal Task for the CCS
Acceptance in our Society, 40(1) Research in Environmental Law 41-77 (2018) [이순자,
‘CCS의 사회적 수용성 제고를 위한 법적 과제’, 40(1) 환경법연구 41-77 (2018)];
Moonsook Park, South Korea’s Legal and Regulatory System for Carbon Capture and
Sequestration: Backgrounds, Current Circumstances, and Recommendations, 18(1)
Journal of Korean Law 235-268 (2018)]; and Moon-Ji Rhee, Legal & Regulatory
Issues of CCS Projects. 36 Anam Law Review 681-739 (2011) [이문지, ‘온실가스 감축
을 위한 이산화탄소 회수,저장사업의 법적 규제’, 36 안암법학 681-739 (2011)].
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a specific enactment be created for offshore CCS activities in South Korean
waters, in the same spirit of the EU’s CCS Directive, to coordinate better
with the pre-existing array of environmental and safety regulatory
enactments already in place.88)
1. Framework Act on Environmental Policy
The Framework Act on Environmental Policy (FAEP) has the regulatory
aims to prevent environmental pollution and environmental damage and to
manage and preserve the environment in a sustainable manner.89) It
provides rule to enable a cross-generation model of sustainable
development.90)
It defines the environment to be composed of the ‘natural environment’
and the ‘living environment.’91) The natural environment is defined to
include both ecosystems and natural scenery, further including all life forms
underground, at the surface, in the seas, and above the ground, including
all the inanimate matter surrounding them.92) Living environment is defined
as that space of humans and their daily lives, inclusive of “air, water, soil,
waste, noise, vibration, malodor, and sunshine.”93) To the extent that
88) This aligns with the findings presented by Global CCS Institute, which found that
Korea’s legal frameworks for CCS activities gained 37.7 out of 87 possible points
(43%), resulting in South Korea placing into the ‘BAND B CCS-specific laws or
existing laws that are applicable across parts of the CCS project cycle;’ see Ian
Havercroft, “Global CCS Institute CCS Legal and Regulatory: A Global Assessment of
National Legal and Regulatory Regimes for Carbon Capture and Storage” (Global
Carbon Capture and Storage Institute, 2015), 9. In fact, the report found that South
Korea was weakest in the category of “The Comprehensiveness of the legal
framework in providing for all aspects of a CCS project, including siting, design,
capture, transport, storage, closure and monitoring for potential releases of stored
CO2,” receiving only 13 of 36 possible points (36%); id., 23. Korea also scored poorly
for stakeholder and public involvement issues and for liability rules and post-closure
risk management; id.
89) FAEP art. 1.
90) FAEP art. 2.
91) FAEP art. 3(1).
92) FAEP art. 3(2).
93) FAEP art. 3(3).
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offshore CCS activities were to occur within Korean jurisdictional waters
and the attached lands below, FAEP’s definition of environment would be
engaged and applicable.
FAEP defines environmental pollution as derived from industrial and
other human activities that inflict damage on human health or the
environment by means of “air pollution, water pollution, soil pollution, sea
pollution, radioactive contamination, noise, vibration, malodor, sunshine
interceptions, etc.”94) As so defined, environmental pollution displays a
human-centric perspective in contrast to the nature-centered definition of
environmental damage. FAEP defines environmental damage as serious
inflictions of damage on the intrinsic function of the natural environment.95)
If an offshore CCS activity were to damage human health or the
environment, or if those activities were to cause serious inflictions of
damage to the natural environment surrounding a CCS site, then the
offshore CCS activity could be a source of environmental pollution or
damage, correspondingly.
Environmental preservation is then defined as “any activity undertaken to
protect the environment from pollution and damage, … as well as to
maintain and create more delightful environmental conditions.”96) To that
end, the Framework Act requires the State, not the private actor, to
undertake environmental impact assessments to analyze the impact of
potential development plans if a development would foreseeably impact the
environment.97) Furthermore, the national government is required to provide
economic incentives to promote the efficient utilization of resources and to
reduce environmental pollution.98)
It is foreseeable that the underlying motive for an offshore CCS project
is to protect and preserve the environment generally from the consequences
of carbon emissions and of subsequent impacts from anthropogenic climate
94) FAEP art. 3(4). It is noted that these subsidiary ideas of pollution are not defined
within the Act itself.
95) FAEP art. 3(5).
96) FAEP art. 3(6).
97) FEAP art. 41(1).
98) FEAP art. 32.
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change. Given the intrusion into the offshore environment and the potential
impact from offshore drilling, injecting, and storage activities, it is likely
that an environmental impact assessment would be required of each
offshore CCS project.
Given the preservation argument for CCS activities, the State would be
required to provide economic incentives to encourage this means of
environmental preservation and of efforts required to capture and relocate
the CO2 from emission sources. Yet, the State would similarly be obligated
to provide economic incentives to ensure that offshore CCS operations
would be undertaken both efficiently with regards to its environmental
settings and with a focus on the prevention of environmental pollution.
Under the Framework Act, all and any business entities are obligated to
prevent environmental pollution and damage and must participate in
environmental preservation policies both local and national government
actors.99) Korea’s Framework Act embodies the Polluter Pays principle,
requiring parties to be liable to prevent environmental pollution, to prevent
environmental damage, to recover or restore the environment, and to also
bear the expenses of others engaged in the restoration of the environment
caused by the first party’s own acts.100) Strict liability, called ‘absolute
liability’ in the official translation, is the rule of liability applied under the
Framework Act;101) in cases of multiple parties, the liability is to be
handled joint and severally.102) The Act does provide for rapid and fair
settlement of damages from environmental pollution and environmental
damages via mediation.103) And where remedies are not available, the State
is required to provide policies “to smoothly relieve any sufferings caused
by environmental pollution and environmental damage.”104)
Should an operator of an offshore CCS facility cause environmental
pollution or environmental damage, the operator as ‘polluter’ would be held
99) FEAP art. 5.
100) FEAP art. 7.
101) FEAP art. 44(1).
102) FEAP art. 44(2).
103) FEAP art. 42.
104) FEAP art. 43.
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to a rule of strict liability for the injuries incurred and be liable for the
respondent damages. It would be expected that mediation would be brought
by the State to ensure a swift response and to enable quicker compensation
and restoration efforts. Where funds would be lacking, the State and local
governments would be required to assist in relieving suffering from the
CCS accident.
However, it is notable that the Framework Act provides no punishments,
neither incarceration nor fees in punishment are provided as incentives to
prevent environmental pollution and environmental damage.
2. Act on Liability for Environmental Damage and Relief
The Act on Liability for Environmental Damage and Relief (LEDR Act)
provides the victims of environmental damage with means of redress.105)
Environmental damages are those arising from air pollution, water pollution,
soil pollution, marine pollution, noise, vibration, and certain other causes
arising from the installation and operation of a facility.106) The LEDR Act
does not limit the application of the Civil Act in providing a basis for
recovery for environmental or other similar damages.107)
However, it limits the concept of ‘environmental damage’ for the
application of the LEDR Act to the “damage inflicted on the life, body
(including mental harm) or property of any third person.”108) This is clearly
a different frame of reference from the EU’s Environmental Liability
Directive, where the paradigm is on nature itself and on those elements
lacking such direct personal attribution.109) As an interesting buttress to the
notion that the LEDR Act focuses on private injuries, it excludes those
environmental damages that cycle back to the business owner or its
employees if caused by the installation or operation of their own facility.110)
105) LEDR Act art. 1.
106) LEDR Act art. 2(1).
107) LEDR Act art. 5.
108) LEDR Act art. 2(1).
109) Need a footnote.
110) LEDR Act art. 2(1).
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‘Facility’ is a defined term, inclusive of eleven categories of regulated
facilities under separate environmental enactments.111) While offshore CCS
might be included within waste disposal facilities,112) soil contamination
facilities,113) or hazardous chemical substances facilities,114) it is most
reasonable to expect that offshore CCS facilities would qualify under
‘maritime facilities’ as defined within the Marine Environmental
Management Act.115) A ‘business owner’ is likewise defined as an “owner,
installer, or operator who has actual control” over the facility.116)
When the installation or operation of a facility gives rise to
environmental damages, as defined above, then the business owner is
deemed to be liable for the damages.117) Further, when the facts are not in
evidence but it is highly probable that the facility gave rise to the injuries,
then the LEDR Act requires a presumption of the causal relationship
between the activities of the facility and the resultant injuries.118) This
determination is to be made based on a totality of the circumstances
analysis.119) The business owner can raise a defense, that they met their
good faith obligations to prevent environmental damage120) and that they
have met all the regulatory requirements under the LEDR Act, then they
shall be exempted from the application of the presumption.121)
However, even if the business owner is found to be liable, there are
financial limits to that liability.122) Liability is capped at KRW 200 billion,
roughly equivalent to $180 million.123) That cap does not apply in certain
111) LEDR Act art. 3(1) to (11).
112) LEDR Act art. 3(3).
113) LEDR Act art. 3(6).
114) LEDR Act art. 3(7).
115) LEDR Act art. 3(10). For a discussion on the definitions and legal ramifications of
the Marine Environmental Management Act for offshore CCS activities, see sec ##,
infra.
116) LEDR Act art. 2(3).
117) LEDR Act art. 6(1).
118) LEDR Act art. 9(1).
119) LEDR Act art. 9(2).
120) As detailed at LEDR Act art. 4(3).
121) LEDR Act art. 9(3).
122) LEDR Act art. 7.
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cases; (i) when the environmental damage is a result of the business owner’s
intentional negligence or gross negligence,124) (ii) when the environmental
damage is a result of the business owner’s per se negligence,125) and (iii)
when the business owner did not respond adequately to the emergent
incident to prevent the environmental damage.126)
Liability for environmental damages is joint and several when it is
impracticable to identify which business owner might be liable for injuries
arising from a joint undertaking.127) Business owners are allowed to allocate
the liabilities for their facilities to subcontractors, given that certain forms
of documentation and disclosure are undertaken.128)
Business owners are required to carry environmental liability insurance,129)
if insurance is not available to the business owner then they must provide
an indemnity contract.130) The Ministry of Environment is enabled to set
minimum deductibles to ensure some retention of risk for the business
owners and the prevention of moral hazard.131) However, there is no
clarification as to what amount of insurance needs to be carried by the
business owner, thus, there are also no penalties for inadequate insurance,
see below. The lack of a minimal threshold of coverage leaves the
requirement overall of little incentive.
The LEDR Act does provide penalties for non-compliance, but they are
surprisingly low in consequences. A business owner that fails to provide
sufficient financial guarantees could face a year in prison or a fine of KRW
10,000,000, roughly $9,000.132) A business owner who refuse to provide
information related to the incident that resulted in environmental damage
can face a fee of KRW 10,000,000 but faces no risk of imprisonment.133)
123) LEDR Act art. 7.
124) LEDR Act art. 7(1).
125) LEDR Act art. 7(2).
126) LEDR Act art. 7(3).
127) LEDR Act art. 10.
128) LEDR Act art. 12(1).
129) LEDR Act art. 17(1).
130) LEDR Act art. 17(2).
131) LEDR Act art. 19(1).
132) LEDR Act art. 47(2)(1).
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Insurance agencies can risk a fine of KRW 10,000,000 for not providing an
environmental liability insurance policy,134) a fine of KRW 10,000,000 for not
making an advance payment in relief,135) or a fine of KRW 5,000,000,
approximately $4,500, for a range of data-related failures.136) Given the
potential high costs of addressing environmental damages, these fines are
not proportionate incentives. (These are also in contrast to the fees and
punishments available for those seeking relief under fraud, which allows for
two years in prison and up to KRW 20,000,000, roughly $18,000.137))
Given the foreseeable situation wherein a victim is unable to receive
proper compensation due to a lack of identifiable fund from the business
owner, the LEDR Act empowers the Ministry of Environment to directly
provide relief to that victim.138) The LEDR Act permits this direct relief
when the identity of the business owner is unknown, when the business
owner is insolvent, when the business owner is thought to have been
extinguished,139) and when the actual damages are in excess of the KRW
200 billion cap.
3. Act on the Control and Aggravated Punishment of Environmental
Offenses
The Act on the Control and Aggravated Punishment of Environmental
Offenses (CAPEO Act) was enacted to provide enhanced tools for the
prevention of and punishment for environmental damages.140)
In the CAPEO Act, the term ‘pollution’ is defined by inclusive reference
to eight different statutes and the term ‘illegal discharge’ by reference to
fourteen statutes,141) reflecting the design of the Act to support a wide
133) LEDR Act art. 49(2)(1).
134) LEDR Act art. 49(1)(1).
135) LEDR Act art. 49(1)(2).
136) LEDR Act art. 49(2)(2) through (5).
137) LEDR Act art. 47(1).
138) LEDR Act art. 23(1).
139) LEDR Act art. 23(1)(1) and (2).
140) CAPEO Act art. 1.
92  법학논고 제69집 (2020. 04)
array of pre-existing environmental enactments. Given analysis of the
relevant statutes, both supra and infra, the CO2 injected and stored for
offshore CCS storage operations is not likely to be considered waste or
illegal pollutants under those statutes.
The Act provides rigorous punishment options to supplement penal
options in pre-existing environmental regulations.
Ÿ For those actors who inflict danger or injury on humans by illegally
discharging pollutants, or those who place drinking waters at risk, shall
face imprisonments of no less than three years.142)
Ÿ For those actors who’s act from the previous statement also include
death of a human victim or injury to a human victim, the
imprisonment should be no shorter than five years.143)
Ÿ For actors who have rendered farm lands unsuitable for farming, who
have contaminated an ocean, river, lake, marsh, or ground water, or
who have caused death to fish or shellfish “en masse” shall face
imprisonment of at least one year but in excess of seven years.144)
While the CO2 might not qualify as a waste or as an illegal pollutant,
leaked volumes of CO2 might possibly place drinking waters at risk, render
injury to farms lands, contaminate various waters, and could place fish or
shellfish at risk. By placing the injection site and geological storage
reservoir offshore, the risks to farm lands and drinking waters could be
essentially eliminated. While leakage could impact adjacent waters, such
leakage at depth would be remediable and unlikely to contaminate the
waters in the sense foreseen by the Act. Again, leakage from injection
activities can be halted and thus risk to fish and shellfish can be mitigated
long before death “en masse” occurs. Thus, while the Act could be brought
141) CAPEO Act art. 2(1)(a) through (g) and 2(2)(a) through (k).
142) CAPEO Act art. 3(1).
143) CAPEO Act art. 3(2).
144) CAPEO Act art. 3(3). There are enumerated specific minimum thresholds of damage,
e.g., 300 square meters of farmland, but these are not ‘difficult’ levels of damage to
achieve.
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to bear on offshore CCS activities, such application is not likely.
There are additional rules to address environmental damage brought by
acts of criminal negligence.145)
Ÿ For actors who have rendered farm lands unsuitable for farming via
criminal negligence, the imprisonment is set at a maximum of seven
years with a fine not exceeding KRW 100 million (approx. USD
100,000).146)
Ÿ For actors who have contaminated an ocean, river, lake, marsh, or
ground water via criminal negligence, the imprisonment is set at a
maximum of ten years with a fine not exceeding KRW 150 million
(approx. USD 150,000). 147)
Ÿ For actors who have caused death to fish or shellfish “en masse” via
criminal negligence, the imprisonment is set at a maximum of three years
with a fine not exceeding KRW 30 million (approx. USD 30,000). 148)
Were offshore CCS operations to be undertaken with criminal negligence,
then certainly the likelihood of harms to waters, fish, and shellfish would
be exacerbated. As such, given management with a character of criminal
negligence, these sections of the Act would be certain to apply to offshore
CCS operations.
Corporate liability for environmental damages are addressed within the
Act. When a representative, an agent, an employee, or another servant of
the corporation acts criminally negligent in a manner leading to
environmental damages, then both the actor and the corporation can be
fined.149) Furthermore, when it is difficult to establish the causal connection
between a business operator’s illegal discharge of pollutants and subsequent
injuries to third parties, the Act requires a presumption of the causation to
145) CAPEO Act art. 5.
146) CAPEO Act art. 5(1).
147) CAPEO Act art. 5(2).
148) CAPEO Act art. 5(3).
149) CAPEO Act art. 10. The attendant fines are the same fines specified in the CAPEO
Act where a private actor would have incurred the fine.
94  법학논고 제69집 (2020. 04)
be assumed by courts and administrative authorities.150) If a business
operator is found guilty of an illegal discharge,151) then the Ministry of
Environment is to levy a fine from 200% to 1,000% of the profits collected
from the business operations associated with the illegal discharge of
pollution.152) As seen above, to the extent that offshore CCS operations are
undertaken with criminal negligence, these sections of the Act would be
likely applied to the business owners and corporate actors responsible for
those acts of criminal negligence.
Following on the requirement to provide economic incentives, the
Ministry of Environment is directed to provide ‘prizes’ and to ‘pay rewards’
to private parties who identify and bring to the awareness of governmental
agencies the existence of environmental law violations prior to the
discovery of such violations by government agencies.153) This is a useful
tool to provide rigor to private regulatory mechanisms.154)
4. Environment Improvement Expenses Liability Act
The Environment Improvement Expenses Liability Act (EIEL Act)
provides the tools to effect the polluter pays principle in Korean
environmental law.155) Of note, it is a very short enactment. It enables the
Ministry of the Environment to impose and collect environmental
improvement charges from the owners of buildings, facilities, or vehicles
that directly cause environmental pollution.156) These fees shall be governed,
mutatis mutandis, by Korea’s Framework Act on National Taxes, following
the pattern seen in other Korean environmental codes.157)
The fees so collected are to be used to subsidize environmental
150) CAPEO Act art. 11.
151) As defined at CAPEO Act art. 2.
152) CAPEO Act art. 12(1).
153) CAPEO Act art. 15.
154) See sec. 4.2., infra.
155) EIEL Act art. 1.
156) EIEL Act art. 1(1) and (2).
157) EIEL Act art. 1(7).
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improvement projects under the FAEP Art. 17, and to subsidize air and
water improvement projects carried out be entrepreneurs in pursuit of
low-pollution technology.158) A potential application of such funds could be
to subsidize CCS technology projects as low-pollution technologies.
5. Conservation and Management of Marine Ecosystems Act
The Conservation and Management of Marine Ecosystems Act (CMME
Act) protects certain marine ecosystems by enabling the Ministry of Land,
Transport, and Maritime Affairs to establish and steward ‘protected marine
areas.’159)
The Act charges the Ministry with a “duty to protect the habitat,
spawning areas, and migratory routes of migratory marine animals and
marine mammals.”160) The Ministry may place certain marine animals under
protection,161) preventing their capture or collection.162) Similarly, the
Ministry may designate certain zones as ‘protected marine zones;’163)
preventing acts that damage marine animals or alter the quality or quantity
of public waters,164) amongst other issues, unless overridden by
development activities in consultation with the Ministry.165) Thus, while the
Ministry could set aside a marine area for protection and could list marine
animals known to exist nearby, if the Ministry was also consulted on the
development of an offshore CCS facility, then those protections would not
be applicable.
The penal sections provide that if an actor were to injure marine
organisms under protection, then they could face up to three years in
158) EIEL Act art. 11(1) and (2).
159) CMME Act art. 1 and 2(14).
160) CMME Act art. 16(1).
161) CMME Act art. 19(1).
162) CMME Act art. 20(1).
163) CMME Act art. 25(1). See also art. 43; providing for the establishment of facilities
to conserve and manage marine ecosystems and sound use of the sea.
164) CMME Act art. 27(1)(1), (3), and (4).
165) CMME Act art. 27(2)(5).
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imprisonment and a fine of KRW 20 million (approx. USD 20,000). Actors
who damage marine ecosystems or marine organisms in area for protecting
marine organisms could face up to two years’ imprisonment or a fine up to
KRW 10 million (approx. USD 10,000). But again, to the extent that
offshore CCS operations were development in consultation with the
Ministry, these punishments would not avail.
6. Marine Environment Management Act
The Marine Environment Management Act (MEM Act) was drafted to
“prevent any danger due to either damage of marine environment or
pollution.”166) As such, it has seen a call from Korean academics as a
model for a future Korean CCS legal framework.167)
The term ‘marine environment’ is defined broadly as ‘oceanic nature and
life status,’ including organisms living in the sea and “abiotic environments
such as sea water, oceanic land, marine atmosphere, etc. and human
behavior in the ocean.”168) The scope of its application is intended to
dove-tail with other acts protecting the ocean’s environment.169)
The phrasing for marine pollution bear the hallmark of EU legislation, in
its reference to the introduction of dangerous materials or energy into the
ocean.170) But most importantly, marine pollution is a “status of dangerous
results,” 171) whereas ‘waste’ is defined to be unusable materials that are
discharged into the ocean which cause (or could cause) dangerous results
to the marine environment. So pollution is an injurious state resulting from
166) MEM Act art. 1.
167) Sun-Young Chae & Suk-Jae Kwon, A Study on Domestic Policy Framework for
Application of Carbon Dioxide Capture and Storage (CCS), 18:6 Journal of the
Korean Society of Marine Environment & Safety 617-625 (2012).
168) MEM Act art. 2(1). The word choice ‘abiotic’ is intriguing and leaves the reader
uncertain if it meant the ‘non-living elements of’ the marine environment instead of
the ‘lifeless’ suggestion it might bring in a plain reading of the text. An abiotic
environment is an unnatural state for most of the ocean.
169) MEM Act art. 3(1). See also art. 3(1)(4).
170) MEM Act art. 2(2).
171) MEM Act art. 2(2).
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exogenous materials or energies and waste are the embodiment of unusable
materials that can cause injurious states.
The injection of CO2 into a subterranean geologic reservoir ought not to
provide a substantial source of either marine pollution or waste. In terms of
pollution, only in the case of a leak might CO2 pose a risk as a source of
pollution. Assuming the accident occurred during injection, the leaked
volumes could be controlled and limited by cessation of the activity. If the
leaked volumes were benthic, and the CO2 is at sufficient depth as
foreseen in current offshore CCS storage technologies, there would be little
risk to oceanic water columns and the CO2 could be re-collected and the
area of leakage could be remediated. If the leakage was closer to the
surface, it is likely that the CO2 would cause minimal damage as both
cessation and venting to the surface could minimize the formation of
carbonic acid and other concerns. And as the injected CO2 is expected to
be clean of contaminants, such as H2S, there would be little opportunity for
ancillary pollution from the accident.
Is the CO2 a waste in and of itself? Is it a material which cannot be
utilized itself in the case of discharging into the ocean which will also cause
dangerous results? A repeat of the above analysis suggests that even in
leakage events, barring the most extreme scenarios, that the CO2 would not
likely discharge into the ocean in a manner to cause dangerous results. Thus,
the CO2 should not be considered a waste for the purposes of the Act.
There is another term, ‘pollution material,’ which includes “wastes, oils,
dangerous liquid material, and packaged dangerous material, of which inflow
or discharge into ocean” could be dangerous to the marine environment.172)
Even if the flow of liquid CO2 were to cause dangerous impacts to the
marine environment, and the previous paragraphs have addressed why
small volumes would not so present, the CO2 would need to qualify under
‘dangerous liquid material.”173) A dangerous liquid material is any liquid
that would have dangerous impacts on the marine environment, or a liquid
mixed with such a dangerous liquid, and as designated by the Ministry of
172) MEM Act art. 2(10).
173) MEM Act art. 2(7).
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Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs.174) Thus the key issue is whether
at the time of injection would the Ministry designate the injected CO2
volumes as dangerous liquids? One suspects not, given the announced
government policy to sponsor the development of the technology and the
expected use to reach South Korea’s carbon emission reduction
commitments. Thus, the CO2 is not likely to qualify as a dangerous liquid
nor as a pollution material for offshore CCS projects.
With regards to liability, the MEM Act mandates both the polluter pays
principle and imposes the rule of strict liability.175) Further, it adopts a
position that international agreements on marine environment and pollution
will prevail over domestic enactments; unless the domestic enactment is
more restrictive.176) (Example, although the MEM Act forbids the discharge
of polluting substances from a vessel into the ocean, the rules of the
London Convention and Protocol are more detailed and restrictive and thus
operative.177)) Thus the role of international agreements on offshore CCS,
like the London Protocol to the London Convention, would become applicable
within this Act. The State has an affirmative duty to enforce those rules,
both the domestic enactments and the international conventions.178)
The Ministry of Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs is charged with
collecting what is referred to as a ‘marine environment improvement
surcharge’ fee.179) The surcharge is to be imposed on each act of discharge
or pollution.180) The fee is compulsory to the polluter, and when not paid
timely, it is to be collected under the rules governing national taxes in
arrears.181) To that extent, the fee might be reasonably viewed as a
174) MEM Act art. 2(7).
175) MEM Act art. 7 and art. 5(2), respectively.
176) MEM Act art. 4.
177) See MEM Act art. 22 and 23. The Republic of Korea entered the London Convention
on January 20, 1994, and the London Protocol on February 21, 2009; IMO, “Status of
Multilateral Conventions and Instruments in Respect of Which the International
Maritime Organization or its Secretary-General Performs Depositary or Other
Functions,” September 20, 2016; available at http://www.imo.org/en/About/
Conventions/StatusOfConventions/Documents/Status%20-%202016.pdf
178) MEM Act art. 5(1).
179) MEM Act art. 19(1).
180) MEM Act art. 19(1)(1) and (2).
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pollution tax.
The penal provisions of the MEM Act are separated into intentional acts
and negligent acts sections. Anyone found intentionally discharging wastes,
dangerous liquid materials in violation of the Act could face up to three
years’ incarceration or a fine of up to KRW30 million. (Approx. 30,000
USD.)182) Identical punishments and fee rules faces parties who intentionally
failed to undertake certain prevention measures.183) The punishments and
fines for acts of negligence are lesser; for the same discharges of
pollutants as previously described, the punishment is a maximum two
years’ incarceration and a maximum fine of KRW20 million. (Approx. 20,000
USD.) There are numerous other activities with respondent punishments
and fines.184) In alignment with other environmental laws in South Korea,
the collection of fines in arrears will be collected under the national tax
rules.
7. Development and Management of Deep Sea Water Act
The Development and Management of Deep Sea Water Act (DMDSW
Act) provides a regulatory framework to “ensure that the State preserves
and manages deep sea water … in an environmentally friendly manner.”185)
The application of the Act is limited to “deep sea water,” which is “sea
water in the sea,” above a certain prescribed depth,186) so it would not
apply to subsea volumes located within geological formations. It could
potentially apply to leaks from CCS storage systems that do communicate
into the benthic waters, but only if those sea waters are above the depth
limits so prescribed, which given the circumstances of offshore CCS and
the behavior of CO2 at benthic depths, is not likely.
181) MEM Act art. 20(2).
182) MEM Act art. 127(1).
183) MEM Act art. 127(4) and (5).
184) MEM Act art. 127 through 133.
185) DMDSW Act art 1.
186) DMDSW Act art 2(1).
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The Act does have a contextual focus on drinking water extracted from
oceanic volumes.187) The Act provides the Ministry of Land, Transport, and
Maritime Affairs with the powers to regulate both “deep sea water
development business” and “business related to deep sea water,”188) which
include the activities of “storing, processing, supplying, or selling” of deep
sea water,189) of “manufacturing deep sea drinking water,”190) and of
“importing deep sea drinking water.”191) Offshore CCS operations are not
engaged in the business of deep sea drinking water, nor would it
foreseeably involve storing, processing, supplying, or selling of deep sea
water. Similarly, offshore CCS is not foreseeably engaged in the
manufacturing, marketing, or importing of deep sea drinking water. Thus,
there would not appear to be a direct application of the Act to the
activities of offshore CCS.
However, the Act does provide the Ministry of Land, Transport, and
Maritime Affairs with the powers to manage the marine resources in the
areas from which that deep sea water development businesses would draw
sea water from and the powers to preserve the marine environment,192)
presumably in the same area given the subsequent subsection which refers
to powers to survey the “sea water intake area (including the seafloor) and
adjacent areas.”193) To the extent that a deep sea water development
business is licensed to operate in a given sea water intake area, then an
offshore CCS project in the same vicinity might foreseeably become
regulated under these subsections, primarily with regards to its potential
impact on the seafloor and leakage into water columns in or adjacent to
the sea water intake area. Ideally, the Ministry would coordinate offshore
CCS project planning and sea water intake area planning to avoid
overlapping of operational sites, but it foreseeable that in certain
187) See DMDSW Act art 2(2), on the definition of “deep sea drinking water.”
188) DMDSW Act art 4(1).
189) DMDSW Act art 2(4).
190) DMDSW Act art 2(5).
191) DMDSW Act art 2(5).
192) DMDSW Act art 4(6).
193) DMDSW Act art 4(7).
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circumstances, both planned and accidental, that the offshore CCS
operations could be within the scope of this Act.
While an operator of an offshore CCS operation would not likely need to
receive a license to undertake a deep sea water development business, the
guidelines for standards are illuminating.194) Licensing requires a deep sea
water development business to demonstrate the reasonableness of its
business plans,195) its financial means to handle its operations and
regulatory requirements,196) its technical capacity,197) and its environmental
planning for the sea water operations. 198) Persons having records of
incompetence or criminality are barred from obtaining licenses, but there is
no guidance provided for insolvent persons.199) Should a business violate
the environmental protection standards,200) the Ministry is granted authority
to revoke the business’s license.201) These types of requirements, of proofs
of financial securities, technological capacity and precaution, and of
forward-looking environmental planning, are in alignment with model
international regulations for offshore CCS operations.
Once a license is received, the operator would become liable to pay fees
for the privilege and occupation of using deep sea water to local regional
governments.202) When these fees are not timely paid by the operator, their
collection will be sought under the local tax code.203) Thus, these fees are
a kind of franchise taxes.
Similarly, the Ministry itself shall charge a fee for the transfer of
property from the State to the private operator.204) The fees collected are to
194) DMDSW Act art 12.
195) DMDSW Act art 12(1).
196) DMDSW Act art 12(2).
197) DMDSW Act art 12(2).
198) DMDSW Act art 12(3) and (4). The Mining Damage Prevention and Restoration Act
does forbid bankrupt or insolvent parties who have not yet been reinstated. MDPR
Act art. 14(2).
199) DMDSW Act art 13. For corporations, officers are to be examined in lieu of the
personhood of the corporation. DMDSW Act art 13(4).
200) See Measures to Preserve the Marine Environment, DMDSW Act, art. 37.
201) DMDSW Act art 23(1)(8). See similarly at art 32(1)(9).
202) DMDSW Act art 39(1).
203) DMDSW Act art 39(4).
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be used for a projects and efforts protecting and preserving marine
ecosystem.205) When these fees are not timely paid, they are to be collected
under the provisions of national taxation for defaults.206) As such, these
fees appear to function as a form of severance or production taxes.
Chapter VII, “Supplementary Provisions,” provides legal guidance on the
protection of the environment. Business operators are required to take
measures necessary to prevent pollution of the marine environment.207) The
Ministry itself is granted authority to examine business operators and to
order them to “take measures to preserve the marine environment or take
corrective measures.”208) A person, including officers of corporations, who
fail to comply with the requirements under Art. 37 can be punished with
imprisonment for no more than three years or be fined not more than
KRW15 million. (Approx. 14,000 USD.) The financial penalty of KRW15
million is not a substantial cost vis-à-vis the expected costs of operating
an offshore CCS project and might not prove a meaningful incentive. The
potential risk of imprisonment is a stronger incentive, one that reaches
beyond insolvency of the operator, but one worries that in a complex
setting with many actors that courts might be faced with complexity and
high transaction costs in seeking such a punishment.
8. Submarine Mineral Resources Development Act
As the purpose of the Submarine Mineral Resources Development Act
(SMRD Act) is to support the rational exploitation of “the sea areas
adjacent to the coasts of the Korean Peninsula,”209) one might be hopeful
that offshore carbon storage would be addressed within the SMRD Act,
204) DMDSW Act art 40(1).
205) DMDSW Act art 40(6).
206) DMDSW Act art 41(3).
207) DMDSW Act art 37(1).
208) DMDSW Act art 37(2).
209) SMRD Act art. 1. Also, the SMRD Act is the offshore alternative to the onshore
Mining Damage Prevention and Restoration Act, which appears to be focused
primarily on coal mining and related concerns.
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such is not the case. Yet, it remains enlightening as to how offshore CCS
might be addressed in a novel act from the legislature.
The Act is primarily focused on the licensing of rights to extract
submarine minerals from the continental shelf areas of South Korea by the
Ministry of Knowledge Economy;210) and notably not by the Ministry of
Land, Transport, and Maritime Affairs. Example, “submarine minerals” are
defined as petroleum, natural gas, and “etc. from among the natural
resources which are rich in the continental shelves of the republic of
Korea.”211) This is an interesting definition because its plain reading refers
only to those minerals which could be described as being abundant in
nature within the offshore subsea lands, except for petroleum and natural
gas. Carbon dioxide is not considered to be “rich in the continental shelves
of the republic of Korea,” and as such would not appear to meet this
definition, much less the vacuous pore space into which it would be
injected, unless again, pore space could be considered a submarine mineral,
which is not a reasonable reading of the word ‘mineral.’
The definition of ‘submarine mining’ includes the exploitation and
gathering of submarine minerals;212) were pore space or the injected carbon
dioxide to be considered submarine minerals, then their utilization in CCS
storage could be considered a sense of ‘exploitation.’213) However, the
definition of ‘submarine mining right’ is delimited to the exploration,
gathering, and acquisition of submarine minerals, making the previous
suggested interpretation of ‘exploitation’ infeasible. Thus, it would seem most
likely that the Act wouldn’t apply to the storage systems of offshore CCS.
The SMRD Act does contain a variety of legal issues that might
eventually be influential in drafting CCS regulatory policy. Even when
leases for submarine mining are to be granted, the Act provides that the
ultimate right remains with the State and not a private operator.214) This
210) SMRD Act art. 2-2(1).
211) SMRD Act art. 2(1).
212) SMRD Act art. 2(2).
213) See the Mining Damage Prevention and Restoration Act (MDPR Act), wherein the
concept of an ‘active mine’ is defined as “a mine in which the ground is drilled to
extract minerals or from which minerals are extracted.” MDPR Act art. 2(2).
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potentially holds great impact for the post-injection cessation of CCS
storage activities and for the addressing of long-term liabilities, as the
State would (potentially) be the owner of the both the injection rights and
the CO2 attached (via permanent storage) to the land-in-place. Exploration
and extraction rights are limited to 10 years and 30 years,215) respectively;
again providing a template for a limited time license to inject CO2 in an
offshore CCS storage project.
The SMRD Act also provides the Ministry of Knowledge Economy with
the powers to require the restoration of the submarine mining site to its
original state within one year of cessation of mining activities.216) Should
the operator fail to do so, the Ministry may take measures to restore the
location under the Administrative Vicarious Execution Act.217) Given that
petroleum and natural gas extraction alter geological reservoirs and that it
is unlikely to be the State’s policy to return those geological reservoirs to
original condition, it is foreseeable and reasonable that the State would also
not seek CO2 storage systems to be returned to their ‘original condition,’
but rather, that the facilities installed near the seabed surface and whatever
platforms or vessels used in injection activities be removed and the oceanic
ecology returned as closely as possible to its original condition.
Of potential importance is the lack of punishment and fee structures that
one might expect to see in an offshore mining act. Most of the few
punishments listed are for operating at various stages without proper
licenses.218) There is a financial penalty for failing to restore the mining
site to an original condition of no more than KRW 10 million,
approximately 10,000 USD. This fee is proportionately tiny in contrast with
the costs of subsea restoration and may in fact operate as an incentive to
214) See SMRD Act art. 4, 9, and 10; note the differences in the terms “submarine
mining right,” held by the State, and “submarine mining concession,” held by the
operator. Art. 19 enables an operator to extinguish its claim to an extraction license,
leaving the State with the assets.
215) SMRD Act art. 9 and 10.
216) SMRD Act art. 19-2(1) and (2).
217) SMRD Act art. 19-2(3).
218) SMRD Act art. 35, 36, and 38(1) and (2).
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not restore in a timely manner, as the time value of deferred restoration
efforts might well dwarf that sum.
9. Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act
The Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act (COPDG Act)
is not foreseeably applicable to offshore CCS operations,219) as the COPDG
Act strictly applies to spilt petroleum and has no breadth to accommodate
CO2 leakages, but its approach to fluid leaks and resultant environmental
damages and liabilities does provide some insight into how offshore CCS
operations might be regulated.
The Act provides specific definitions of the pollutant, ‘oil,’220) and of the
damage it creates, ‘oil pollution damage.’ The definition of oil pollution
damage includes three constituents; loss or damage caused by the spilt
volumes,221) costs of preventative measures in response to the spill, 222) and
additional losses or damages caused by the preventative measures. 223)
Liability for the incident is addressed by the Act. If the leak is from a
tanker, then the owner of the vessel is liable for the oil pollution damage;224)
the Act has no text related to oil pollution damage related to offshore oil
wells and thus appears to assign no liability in those cases. (South Korea
currently produces very little petroleum from an offshore operation and not
from onshore; what volumes it produces are natural gas and light
distillates, not conventional crude oil.225))
219) COPDG Act art. 1.
220) COPDG Act art. 2(5) and (7).
221) COPDG Act art. 2(7)(a).
222) COPDG Act art. 2(7)(b); with ‘preventative measure’ defined at 2(9).
223) COPDG Act art. 2(7)(c).
224) COPDG Act art. 5(1).
225) “Since exploration began in the 1970s, South Korea has discovered one commercially
producing field among its Ulleung Basin, Yellow Basin, and Jeju Basin so far.
Discovered in 1998, Donghae-1, Block 6-1 in the Ulleung Basin, has total proved
reserves of 3.2 million barrels of ultra-light crude (condensates). Although natural
gas production from Donghae-1 began in November 2004, oil production did not
begin until 2010 after further exploration and discovery. On average, KNOC has
produced 1,000 b/d of ultra-light crude (condensates) from the Donghae-1 natural
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Liability for oil pollution damage can be limited,226) if the vessel owner
applies for limited liability;227) limited liability is not available for vessel
owners that acted with intent to cause damages.228) The liability limits are
predicated on the units of tonnage of the vessel, the larger the tonnage the
higher the limit of the liability.229) The liability limit for the smallest
vessels is set at 4.51 million units of account and for the largest of vessels
at 89.77 million units of account;230) that range is approximately 6.31 million
USD to 125.64 million USD.231) Each owner of a vessel is required to carry
an insurance contract for each vessel to satisfy a requirement to bear
indemnity contracts to cover their third-party liability claims.232) When the
oil pollution damage is found to be non-intentional in origin, the third party
can directly sue the insurance company for damages, but not if the
accident was intentional.233)
While penal provisions for illegal discharges and for damages to water
might be applicable under the CAPEO Act, penal provisions under the
COPDG Act are limited to matters of insurance and issues related to
notifications.234) Failure to have insurance in place shall face imprisonment
of not more than three years or a fine not exceeding KRW 50 million
(approx. USD 50,000.) The application of these fines to corporate actors and
business owners follows the guidelines established in the CAPEO Act.235)
gas field, representing a negligible portion of its 2.4 million b/d total petroleum
consumption, nearly all of which was imported.” EIA, “South Korea: International
Energy Data and Analysis,” U.S. Energy Information Agency, (2016), 4-5; available
athttps://www.eia.gov/beta/international/analysis_includes/countries_long/Korea_
South/south_korea.pdf.
226) COPDG Act art. 7(1). See also COPDG Act art. 32, 33, and 34.
227) COPDG Act art. 7(2).
228) COPDG Act art. 7(1).
229) COPDG Act art. 8.
230) COPDG Act art. 8(1) and (2); the unit of account is defined to be the Special
Drawing Rights of the IMF. Id., at 8(2).
231) The IMF provides a daily exchange rate from Special Drawing Rights to U.S. dollars
at its website: http://www.imf.org/external/np/fin/data/rms_sdrv.aspx.
232) COPDG Act art. 14(1) and 15(1) and (3).
233) COPDG Act art. 16.
234) See COPDG Act art. 60, 61, and 62.
235) COPDG Act art. 63.
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10. Summary and Analysis of Regulatory Preparedness for
Offshore CCS Storage Projects in South Korea
What we find in the Korean enactments that might be applicable to any
potential offshore CCS storage plans are a wide mix of methodologies and
approaches, which while each rule or sub-rule might have its own purpose
and policy justification, will ensure complexity and multiplicity of policy
interpretations, frustrating long-term planning of such offshore CCS
opportunities.
The Framework Act, while laudable on many fronts, likely requires the
State, not the operator, to draft and file the EIA for the offshore project.
Further, the Framework Act might require the State to provide subsidies
for the CCS project, potentially frustrating an arms’ length review of its
environmental fitness. And while it calls for application of a strict liability
rule, it provides little bite for regulatory compliance.
The Act on Liability for Environmental Damage and Relief (LEDR Act)
provides what appears to be a robust liability regime, with liability for
operators capped at close to 200M USD. Even the strict liability rule’s test
for causal proximity is relaxed by the Act, enabling more ready application
of the liability rule. This liability rule is backed by a requirement for
operators to carry sufficient insurance, which is also financially supported
(in part) by the State. Again, quite effective policy. However, the fines for
not following the regulatory requirements of the Act are met with
comparatively minimal fines, in the range of 10K to 20K USD, creating no
effective incentive for capital projects that might cost many magnitudes
more to develop and operate.
The primary problem identified with the Act on the Control and
Aggravated Punishment of Environmental Offenses (CAPEO Act) is its
very unlikelihood of applicability to offshore CCS storage projects. That
said, the Act does provide a very good tool set that if brought to apply
could be very useful in its governance of offshore CCS projects, not the
least of which are its allowance for private regulatory mechanisms in
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environmental monitoring.
The Environment Improvement Expenses Liability Act (EIEL Act), due to
its narrow approach, was found highly unlikely to be applicable to the
offshore CCS context.
The Conservation and Management of Marine Ecosystems Act (CMME
Act) could enable protection of special marine zones, but again, the
negative financial incentives provided as punishment range in the 10K to
20K USD range, which provide little transactional cost hesitation for major
construction projects as the offshore CCS storage sites likely would be.
The application of the Marine Environment Management Act (MEM Act)
to offshore CCS storage sites is not expected to be applicable, as the
injection of CO2 into a subterranean geologic reservoir would not be
expected to provide a substantial source of either marine pollution or waste.
A potential additional limit on the applicability of the MEM Act, is that the
Act defers to international conventions, and South Korea is a Party to the
London Convention and to its Protocol, and thus their offshore CCS rules
would override any local interpretation from the MEM Act. And again, the
negative financial incentives provided as punishment range in the 20K to
30K USD range, which provide minimal transactional costs.
The Development and Management of Deep Sea Water Act (DMDSW
Act) is focused on the extraction of potable water supplies from the marine
environment, and as offshore CCS would not be foreseeably engaged in the
manufacturing, marketing, or importing of deep sea drinking water, the
legal nexus between the DMDSW Act and offshore CCS would appear to
be minimal in the basic case, and readily avoidable with careful site
selection.
The Submarine Mineral Resources Development Act (SMRD Act) is
focused on the extraction of resources that are abundant in the submarine
environment. As such, it is the opposite of the injection of what one hopes
is presently a rare gas for subsea and submarine settings. That said, the
leasing paradigms and the call for a return to natural conditions once the
lease is exhausted, may well be fodder for thought in developing a Korean
CCS framework.
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The Compensation for Oil Pollution Damage Guarantee Act (COPDG Act)
is primarily limited in that it is addresses oil spill pollution and was not
definitionally drafted with carbon dioxide leaks in mind. That said, many of
its elements might well be foundations for consideration in the development
of a CCS liability framework.
Thus, overall, South Korea has many excellent enactments for protecting
the marine and oceanic environments, but none provide a full response to
the legal and policy needs of offshore CCS storage projects, nor is it
readily apparent that the current tapestry of those enactments provides a
synoptic narrative of how to construct that legal framework. Thus, South
Korea would benefit from the development of a specific legal framework to
facilitate policy compliance matters and environmental safeguards for both
ministry officials and operators alike.
Ⅳ. Conclusions
This research has demonstrated that a singular comprehensive legal
framework for offshore CCS storage projects remains elusive, despite
strong efforts made in international conventions and in South Korean
domestic enactments to protect marine and oceanic environments. That said,
the tools to build that legal framework can be seen scattered across these
efforts. If pulled together, South Korea could create and enact a leading
model for offshore CCS storage projects.236)
One would likely begin with the CDM’s guidance for CCS projects, as
provided within the Decision 10/CMP.7. By building off of this template,
South Korea would gain both the benefits of one of the more complete
templates to address the legal complexities of offshore CCS and the
potential financial benefits that might follow under the CDM. Next, South
Korean legislators might look to the EU’s CCS Directive for additional
236) And as such, might help to set a trend towards a global standard in CCS legal
frameworks, as called for by Rhee; see Moon-Ji Rhee, Legal & Regulatory Issues
of CCS Projects, 36 Anam Law Review 681-739 (2013).
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guidance on how to transpose the ideas of Decision 10/CMP.7 into effective
and operational language. Additionally, South Korea can draw on its
existing engagements with the London Protocol to ensure that its new
framework remains in compliance with those rules. Finally, South Korea
might avail itself of the resources available from cooperating with OSPAR
on environmental protection in the ocean and marine settings.
While modelling its CCS legal framework on these international
conventions could expedite the timeframe of development while ensuring
coordination on certain key issues, such as the CDM’s financial
mechanisms, the reviewed Korean environmental enactments all offer
positive elements to retain and coordinate within the Korean CCS
Framework. As seen in the EU context, its own CCS Directive draws on a
variety of other EU environmental rules and enactments, which strengthen
and reinforce the whole of the system.
Thus, while this research found that South Korea presently lacks a
coordinated legal framework for offshore CCS projects; this research equally
finds that South Korea could rapidly and readily design and prepare such a
South Korean Legal Framework for Offshore CCS based on its own
environmental laws and on existing international conventions.
Given the urgency to reduce carbon emissions, and given South Korea’s
pre-existing leadership on green energy transitions, it is readily foreseeable
that Korea could again take leadership and draft such a unified enactment
for its future offshore CCS projects.
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[Abstract]
Regulatory Frameworks for South Korea’s Offshore Carbon
Capture and Storage (CCS) Activities
237)Roy Andrew Partain*
This article provides a comparative review of existing Korean regulations
against model regulatory frameworks for carbon capture and storage (CCS)
projects within South Korean waters. Its analysis will demonstrate that South
Korea’s existing environmental laws and existing international conventions
to regulate offshore CCS activities can be used to draft a robust stand-alone
legal framework appropriate for offshore CCS storage projects in South
Korean waters.
Carbon capture and storage (CCS) is a technology that could enable nations
that emit greenhouse gases from their industrial activities to capture the
emission before they reach the atmosphere and to place those greenhouse
gases into deep geological storage. CCS re-purposes a pre-existing technology
which injected carbon dioxide (CO2) into geological formations to enhance the
production of crude oil from older fields; in those operations, it was discovered
that most of the injected CO2 never returned to the surface, suggesting the
potential to store CO2 in that manner. While some green scholars and activists
oppose its implementation, many have seen CCS as a potential bridging
technology to enable earlier reductions in net greenhouse gas emissions while
maintaining industrial output levels, until greener technological alternatives are
mainstays of industrial economies. These carbon storage activities could be
undertaken both onshore and offshore of the industrial economies.
Because Korea has few suitable onshore storage locations for carbon storage,
it will need to plan for offshore CCS operations. Legally, this could be
fortuitous, as it would reduce the complexity of overlapping national and local
* PhD, JD, MSc, MSc, Chair Professor of International Law and Sustainability, School of
Law, University of Aberdeen, Scotland, United Kingdom
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administration issues and further could take inspiration from pre-existing
international conventions on offshore CCS activities, such as under the 1996
Protocol to the Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping
of Wastes and Other Matter (“London Protocol”), the EU’s Directive on the
Geological Storage of Carbon Dioxide (“the CCS Directive”), OSPAR Decision
2007/2 for the Convention for the Protection of the Marine Environment of the
North-East Atlantic (“OSPAR Convention”), and the Decision 10/CMP.7 of the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol, under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change. This article evaluates these
conventions comparatively with a variety of South Korean environmental
enactments to find that if South Korea brought together its laws with key
elements from those conventions, then South Korea could create and enact a
leading model for offshore CCS storage projects.
Keywords : Carbon capture and storage, CCS, carbon dioxide, hydrate, offshore, 
South Korea, injection, greenhouse gas, climate change

